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3. How
 
Willing are Europeans to Migrate? 
 A Comparison of Migration Intentions 
 in Western and Eastern Europe 
 Didier Fouarge and Peter Ester 
  
3.1 INTRODUCTION1 
The issue of geographic and labour market mobility has taken a prominent 
position on the EU policy agenda with the accession of new Member States 
to the European Union. The year 2006 was officially chosen as the ‘European 
Year of Workers’ Mobility’ by the European Commission. This reflects the 
policy saliency of the mobility issue in Europe. At present, however, the 
stock of nationals from the new Member States living in an EU15 Member 
State is rather limited. In EU15, 7.6 per cent of the working age population is 
non-national: the large majority is from outside the EU (5.1 per cent), 
followed by nationals from other EU15 countries (2.1 per cent). Only 0.4 per 
cent is from one of the new Member States, relatively larger shares are 
observed in Ireland (2 per cent), Austria (1.4 per cent) and Germany (0.7 per 
cent).2 The fear, however, is that the free movement of workers in Europe 
could lead to a large and uncontrolled migration flow from East to West, that 
is from the new Member States to the old Member States. Although the true 
dimension of migration is difficult to assess empirically, a number of studies 
attempted at doing so. An econometric study by Boeri and Brücker (2001) 
estimates that the stock of immigrants from the new Member States in the old 
Member countries might increase from less than 1 million in 1998 to some 3 
to 4.5 million persons in 2030 (see also European Commission, 2001). 
Layard et al. (1994) expect some 3 million people from the new Member 
States to migrate to the EU15 in 15 years’ time. A Dutch study by De Mooij 
(2000) estimates a migration potential of 3 to 4 million persons following the 
EU enlargement. Zimmerman (1995) even refers to higher estimates ranging 
from 5 to 50 million migrants from Eastern Europe within 10 to 15 years. 
Recent research based on micro data also suggests that the accession of the 
new EU member countries has boosted mobility intentions in those countries 
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(Vandenbrande et al., 2006).3 Several other studies based on the analysis of 
migration intentions data also suggest that the readiness to move to another 
country is high in some of the new Member States (Krieger, 2004; Liebig and 
Sousa-Poza, 2004). See also Fassmann and Münz (2002) for an extensive 
overview of macro and micro econometric studies devoted to the estimation 
of migration flows from East to West. 
There are at least two ways in which the issue of migration is linked to the 
theme of transitional labour markets. In the first place, globalisation of 
economic relations and knowledge society contribute to new dynamics on 
markets. Globalisation contributes to an increased mobility of labour and 
capital. At the same time, the rising knowledge economy is conducive to 
changes in the demand for labour. The demand for high-skilled labour 
increases while the demand for low-skilled labour decreases. This results in 
migratory movements of high-skilled labour to markets where the demand is 
relatively high. Such migratory movements induce new types of social risks 
(social security rights for example). In the second place, the concept of 
transitional labour markets refers to some idea of efficient allocation of 
labour within the life course of people, but also at the macro level. The 
underlying idea in the literature is that there are potential gains to both 
geographic and job mobility. Firstly, such gains are derived from the 
relocation of labour from regions with a surplus of workers to regions with 
labour shortages. Secondly, such gains result from a more efficient allocation 
of labour to activities and regions where they are more productive. 
In this chapter we report on the migration intentions of Europeans and 
investigate the main correlates of such intentions.4 This study investigates 
four main issues:  
 
1. mobility intentions of people in the new and old Members States; 
2. the micro and macro determinants of intended cross-border mobility; 
3. the impact of past experience with mobility – and the motive thereof – 
on future intended cross-border mobility; and 
4. the main barriers and triggers to cross-border mobility within Europe.  
 
Because we study migration intentions, our contribution has its limits. We 
do not claim to forecast actual migratory movements: the study of intentions 
is indeed sensitive to phrasing and timing of the survey. However, because 
intentions are good predictors of behaviour (see Section 3.3), with these 
analyses, we contribute to the knowledge on cost–benefit analysis people 
perform when deciding whether or not to migrate. We do this using the 2005 
Eurobarometer Mobility Survey (EB64.1). At the time of writing, this is the 
most recent Europe-wide survey on mobility intentions, including samples 
from all – both old and new – Member States of Europe.5  
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 summarises previous 
research on micro- and macro-determinants of migration decisions and 
outlines our main expectations and hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data 
collected in the Eurobarometer Mobility Survey in some detail. Section 3.4 
presents descriptive results on migration intentions in European countries. 
We focus explicitly on differences in migration intentions between old and 
new Member States. Finally, Section 3.5 summarises the major findings and 
sketches consequences for the current migration policy debate in Europe. 
3.2 THE DECISION TO MIGRATE 
According to the socio-economic literature on migration, the decision 
whether or not to migrate crucially depends on the individual’s comparison 
of the costs of migrating to the benefits of it. If the expected benefits are 
larger than the expected costs, then the individual is likely to migrate. 
Generally speaking, the cost–benefit analysis depends on socio-economic 
characteristics (such as the labour market status, the level of human capital), 
demographic characteristics (such as the household composition), social and 
cultural characteristics (such as social ties or language), general views and 
perceptions on migration and its effects, the distance of the move, and 
specific institutional features such as portability of social security rights or 
other institutional barriers to migration.  
The available migration literature specifies several factors that are likely to 
affect the decision to move. These factors can be classified into micro 
(individual level) and macro (aggregate) determinants of migration. These 
determinants include economic, social and cultural features that are likely to 
affect the decision to migrate. In so doing, we adopt an interdisciplinary 
approach to the costs–benefit analysis of migration. 
Micro Level Correlates of Migration 
Obviously, economic self-improvement ranks among the most influential 
individual-level determinants of the migration choice. Pull factors include the 
immediate employment and wage opportunities in the host country (Harris 
and Todaro, 1970). But maybe even more important are the expected wage 
and employment prospects as stated in Sjaastad’s human capital theory of 
migration (Sjaastad, 1962). This means that the migration decision is driven 
by the perceived earnings growth in the host country (Chiswick, 1978). 
Economic pull factors also involve social security benefits in the host country 
(so-called ‘welfare magnets’: Borjas, 1999). Furthermore, the housing market 
in the receiving country is a decisive migration factor as well, particularly, of 
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course, greater availability of houses and space at lower prices. Vice versa, 
lacking availability of affordable housing in the home country can then be 
seen as a major push factor (OECD, 2005).  
Migration decisions are often related to demographic events as well, such 
as separation from one’s partner. Additionally, the migration literature clearly 
points at the fact that migration is not just an individual decision but also and 
often primarily a household choice. In economic terms: a household will only 
migrate when utility gains of some of the household members exceed the 
utility loss of other household members (Mincer, 1978). Furthermore, authors 
have also pointed out that migration can be seen as risk-sharing behaviour 
(Stark, 1991). In this context, the household – rather than the individual alone 
– is making the migration decision in order to maximise household income 
and to minimise the labour markets risks for the household. 
The presence and accessibility of social networks in the destination 
country is of crucial importance too (Massey et al., 1993, 1994; Zavodny, 
1997; Hatton and Williamson, 2002). In fact, social ties have indeed a 
significant negative effect on the geographic mobility (Belot and Ederdeen, 
2006; Belot and Ermisch, 2006). Such social networks ensure the 
transferability of social capital to incoming migrants and yield a better 
circulation of necessary information, which will foster mobility (Massey et 
al., 1994). Such network effects can result in either positive or negative 
externalities (Massey et al., 1993). Positive externalities imply that the utility 
of the migrant will be larger in the host country when social networks of 
peers are well developed and maintained. Negative externalities imply that 
the concentration of non-nationals has negative effects on the utility of 
nationals (due, for example, to increased competition). However, existing 
social networks in the country of origin are likely to contribute to the 
perceived cost of mobility. As Belot and Ermisch (2006) demonstrate, people 
with a tighter social network are less likely to move to another place of 
residence.  
A further interesting finding is that future mobility is also affected by past 
mobility: movers tend to stay movers (Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004; 
Vandenbrande et al., 2006). Past mobility is likely to reduce the total cost of 
future mobility because it lowers the psychological cost of mobility as well as 
its actual cost due to the availability of better information. An interesting 
hypothesis to be tested is whether or not it matters for which reason (labour-
related or socio-demographic reason) people moved in the past. 
Migration and Macro Level Characteristics 
At the macro level the migration literature suggests a number of socio-
economic determinants of the decision to migrate. At the most general level 
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these determinants include the current labour market situation in the home 
country: lack of employment opportunities or too low earnings in the home 
country act as incentives for migration. Moreover, the GDP level – more 
specifically: a low level of wealth in the country of residence – is also a 
migration stimulus. But it has to be added that the functional form for the 
effect of GDP on migration is not straightforward. As discussed by Pedersen 
et al. (2004), the relationship is not necessarily linear, but could also be in the 
form of an inverted U-shape. At low levels of wealth, out-migration is limited 
because people lack financial possibilities to finance their migration. As 
income rises, migration increases, but at high levels of wealth out-migration 
is less probable due to lack of pressing economic incentives to migrate 
(Hatton and Williamson, 2002). Pedersen et al. (2004), however, were not 
able to empirically verify this inverted-U relationship. 
Furthermore, the taxation regime (for example excessive taxation, fiscal 
burden) may operate as an incentive to migrate. This will be especially true 
for the highly skilled who seek to maximise their net gains by moving to 
regions with lower taxation (Borjas, 1987), but also for welfare recipients 
who are expected to migrate as a response to differences in levels of welfare 
benefits (Borjas, 1999). Regional differences in returns to skills – for 
example reflected by a higher level of income inequality – have also been 
pointed at as an incentive to migrate for the high educated (Borjas 1987; 
Chiquiar and Hansen, 2002). 
Despite economic incentives to migration, the literature also points to non-
economic macro determinants. Differences in culture and language, for 
example, have been shown to be important determinants of the costs of 
migration (Belot and Ederveen, 2006). Other determinants such as natural 
disasters, war and political insecurity are important too, but remain beyond 
the scope of this research.  
Expectations 
To summarise, we expect migration intentions among European citizens to be 
higher if: 
 
1. the expected returns are high (higher educated);  
2. the pay-back period for costs is long (youth); 
3. the household structure is such that it induces low costs (no children, 
single); 
4. one has experience with mobility in the past; 
5. one sees no language or cultural barriers; 
6. one does not expect negative effects for social ties;  
7. economic prospects in the home country are bad; 
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8. for the higher educated: when inequality in the home country is low.  
3.3 DATA: THE 2005 EUROBAROMETER MOBILITY 
 SURVEY 
The data used for this study are from a special module of the Eurobarometer: 
the Eurobarometer Mobility Survey (EB 64.1).6 The data collection – which 
was financed by the European Commission – was carried out in the 25 
countries that were Member of the EU in September 2005. The countries 
surveyed are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Bulgaria and Romania that entered 
the EU in 2007 were not surveyed and are not considered in this research. 
The Mobility Survey is the most recent and the most comprehensive survey 
on past mobility behaviour and mobility intentions among EU countries. It is 
of particular interest since it gathers data on both old and new Member 
States. 
The dataset includes some 24,500 respondents aged 15 years and over.7 
The basic sample design applied in all states is a multi-stage, random 
(probability) one. In each country, a number of sampling points was drawn 
with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the 
country) and to population density. Use was made of face-to-face interviews 
and in the appropriate national language. As far as the data capture is 
concerned, Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) was used in those 
countries where this technique was available.  
About 1,000 respondents were interviewed in each country. In 
Luxembourg and Malta only 500 people were interviewed. The samples for 
West and East Germany were merged so that we have some 1,500 cases in 
Germany. The samples for Great Britain and Northern Ireland were also 
merged, resulting in some 1,300 cases for the UK. When weighted, the data 
are representative for the national population. The analyses presented in this 
chaapter pertain to the population aged 18 to 64. The survey includes relevant 
background information of the respondent (gender, age, educational level), 
his or her household (marital status, children), his or her labour market status 
(whether working or unemployed, occupational status) and labour market 
experience (age at first job, number of jobs in the past). In view of the small 
sample size it is important to test the significance of bivariate findings. 
Alternatively, multivariate analysis has added value because it tests for 
significance while at the same time controlling for the effects of other 
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variables. We apply both descriptive (Section 3.4) and multivariate (Section 
3.5) analysis methods.  
The main themes of the Eurobarometer Mobility Survey relate to 
geographical and labour market mobility in Europe. Of particular interest to 
us is the information on geographical mobility. This includes short and long 
distance mobility in the past and the motives for mobility. The survey also 
contains questions on mobility intentions (within and between countries), and 
encouraging and discouraging factors to move within and outside of the EU. 
These questions stand central in this research where we focus on people’s 
intentions to migrate in the future. The question on intended geographical 
mobility was phrased as follows:  
 
‘Do you think that in the next five years you are likely to move:  
1. in the same city/town/village;  
2. to another city/town/village but in the same region;  
3. to another region but in the same country;  
4. to another country in the European Union;  
5. to another country outside the European Union;  
6. you don’t think you will move.’  
 
More than one answer could be given to the question. The total number of 
respondents (aged 18–64) that expressed their mobility intention amounts to 
17,493 persons. In this chapter, we make no distinctions between people 
reporting the expectation to move ‘to another country in the European Union’ 
or ‘to another country outside the European Union’. Only a very limited 
number of people who express an intention to migrate outside the EU have 
no intention to move within the EU. For ease of exposition, we then interpret 
all migration intentions as intentions to move within the EU. The main 
disadvantage of this special mobility module, however, is that it neither 
carries information concerning the location or country people intend to move 
to, nor on the intended duration of the stay in the destination country. 
But how reliable are migration intentions data? The decision to move is a 
complex, multi-faceted choice. Merely measuring the intention to move as a 
sole indicator of the act to move ignores the complexity of the whole decision 
process. Following Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action, 
we can state that the intention to move is a function of the attitude towards 
moving and existing subjective norms toward moving; the attitude towards 
moving is a function of beliefs about the (positive and negative) consequen-
ces of moving and the evaluations of these consequences; the subjective 
norm towards moving is a function of the normative (positive and negative) 
beliefs about moving and one’s motivation to comply with those beliefs. But 
between the intention to move and the actual move may be a world of 
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intervening factors: individual skills, alternative behaviours available, 
situational constraints, institutional barriers and so on. Nevertheless, as 
Manski (1990) shows, the intentions do, under certain circumstances, have a 
predictive value for future behaviour. The use of intention data in labour 
market and migration studies is well-established.8 And empirical studies 
support the idea that the actual probability of moving to another place is 
indeed significantly larger for people who express the desire to move than for 
people who do not (see for example Böheim and Taylor, 2002; Gordon and 
Molho, 1995). From a policy perspective, understanding migration intentions 
is important too: future migration flows are currently probably the hottest 
topic on the EU policy agenda, both at the level of the EU and of the indi-
vidual Member States. 
3.4 MIGRATION INTENTIONS IN EUROPE 
Mapping of Migration Intentions in Europe 
As explained above, we consider that people who expect to move ‘to another 
country in the European Union’ or ‘to another country outside the European 
Union’ within the next five years are reporting a migration intention. Overall, 
5.4 per cent of Europeans of working age is reporting such a migration 
intention. However, the differences across countries are large, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.1.  
In particular citizens of Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary express a low level of migration intentions. On the 
contrary, a large share of the population in Denmark, Ireland, the Baltic 
States and Poland expresses an intention to migrate to another country. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible at the time of writing to compare these 
migration intentions to actual migration figures. 
The difference in mobility intentions in the Baltic States and Poland 
compared to the other new Member States is striking. But can we take these 
intentions on their face values? Based on previous waves of the 
Eurobarometer, Krieger (2004) has suggested that the percentage of people 
with a ‘firm’ intention to migrate is a third of the percentage of people 
expressing a general inclination to migrate.9 With mobility intentions of 13 
per cent in Lithuania and close to 10 per cent in Poland, Estonia and Latvia, 
this would mean that between 2.4 and 4.2 per cent of the residents of these 
countries have a ‘firm’ intention to migrate. Such intentions are significantly 
lower in the other new Member States. Whether or not migration intentions 
are realistic can also be assessed from econometric studies. Using advanced 
econometric methods and applying migration streams at the time of the EU 
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accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to a number of accessing and 
candidate countries, Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) report expected long-
term migration ranging from 0.2 per cent for Slovenia, 6 per cent for Poland, 
up to almost 28 per cent for Romania in the case of free migration. The 
authors, however, suggest taking such simulations with caution and they hold 
to the overall conclusion that ‘it is reasonable to expect long-run emigration 
rates from the East to the West of between 2–3 per cent of the population in 
the sending region’ (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999, p. 46). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Migration intentions of Europeans (2005), percentage of people 
 intending to move to another country within or outside the EU  
Migration Intentions and Human Capital  
In Table 3.1, we present a breakdown of mobility intentions by gender, age, 
educational level, employment status and household type. Mobility intentions 
for EU25 are reported as well for the old Member States and the new 
Member States. The new Member States are separated in two groups (see 
Figure 3.1): those with a low overall level of mobility intentions (Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia) and those with a 
high level of mobility intentions (Poland and the Baltic States). The table 
reports the percentage of people with a migration intention for each subgroup 
as well as the relative migration risk. The relative migration risk (rmr) is the 
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ratio of the migration intention in a subgroup and the migration intention in 
the total. For example, for females in the old Member States the rmr equals 
4.0/5.0 = 0.79, which says that their level of migration intentions is about 80 
per cent of that in the total population. This makes the comparison of sub-
group differences in migration intentions across columns more visible.  
Table 3.1 Migration intentions by gender, educational level, age, 
 employment status, and household type; percentage of people with 
 a migration intention (%) and relative migration risk (rmr) 
 
EU25 Old 
Member 
States 
New 
Member 
States 
New 
Member 
States 
   Low intentionsa High intentionsb 
 % % rmrc % rmrc % rmrc 
Total 5.4 5.0 1 3.0 1 10.1 1 
Gender        
Male 6.5 6.1 1.21 3.9 1.28 11.4 1.13 
Female 4.4 4.0 0.79 2.2 0.73 9.0 0.88 
Educational level        
Low or no 2.1 2.1 0.42 1.5 0.48 2.5 0.25 
Average 4.0 3.9 0.77 2.1 0.71 6.1 0.60 
High 6.6 6.1 1.21 4.4 1.45 12.3 1.22 
Still studying 16.7 14.7 2.92 9.6 3.17 29.6 2.92 
Age        
18–24 12.6 11.6 2.31 7.6 2.52 21.5 2.12 
25–34 8.3 7.3 1.45 4.7 1.57 18.9 1.87 
35–44 3.6 3.2 0.65 1.8 0.61 7.9 0.77 
45–54 2.8 3.1 0.61 0.7 0.22 2.4 0.24 
55–64 2.4 2.5 0.51 1.5 0.49 1.6 0.15 
Employment status        
Working 4.8 4.8 0.95 1.8 0.60 7.6 0.75 
Unemployed 7.8 7.1 1.40 8.2 2.72 10.4 1.03 
Retired 2.0 1.9 0.38 1.0 0.32 2.9 0.28 
Housewife/man 1.9 1.2 0.24 3.2 1.06 12.3 1.22 
Still studying 16.7 14.7 2.92 9.6 3.17 29.6 2.92 
Household type        
Couple (no child) 4.4 4.0 0.79 1.7 0.56 9.2 0.90 
Couple (with child) 3.0 2.7 0.54 1.8 0.59 6.1 0.60 
Single 11.4 10.8 2.15 8.3 2.76 20.6 2.03 
Single parent 7.2 5.9 1.18 7.7 2.56 16.5 1.63 
Divorced/separated 4.5 4.2 0.84 1.5 0.50 9.2 0.90 
Widowed 4.7 4.8 0.95 0.4 0.13 7.1 0.70 
Notes: 
a. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
b. Lithuania, Poland, Estonia and Latvia. 
c. rmr = migration intentions in subgroups divided by migration intentions in total. 
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According to the literature,
 
human capital is likely to
 
play an important 
role in explaining migration (Sjaastad, 1962; OECD, 2001). The standard 
prediction from migration theory (see Massey et al., 1993) that the typical 
migrant is a young, higher educated and single male, is confirmed by the EB 
data. Of all European men, 6.5
 
per
 
cent report an intention to move across
 
borders compared to 4.4 per cent European women. The higher educated (6.6 
per cent) and especially students (almost 17 per cent) indicate higher 
between-country migration proneness.10 The high absolute level of migration 
intentions among students in the Baltic States and Poland (almost 30 per 
cent) could reflect the enhanced awareness and sensitivity of this specific 
group for the need to ‘go international’, combined with the effort of the 
European Union to promote cross-border mobility of students, for example 
through the Erasmus and Socrates programmes (Vandenbrande et al., 2006, 
Chapter 2). Mobility intentions of the higher educated in new Member States 
are also relatively higher compared to the old Member States, while 
migration intentions of the low educated are relatively lower. Students and 
the high educated from the new Member States seem to realise very well that 
in order to further advance their education and career opportunities Going 
West is a promising option. 
Singles, and to a lesser extent single parents, also express the intention to 
migrate to another country more often than average. The readiness to migrate 
is especially observable among the youngest cohort of Europeans. It is not 
clear from these cross-sectional data – though obviously very important – 
whether this reflects an age or cohort (or even period) effect. Stronger 
intentions to cross-border migration are also observed for unemployed. A 
possible explanation is that for the employed, the need to migrate is relatively 
lower, for they already have a secured economic situation. However, this 
does not necessarily imply that more unemployed than employed people will 
actually migrate in the (near) future: the employed people – although they 
less often express an intention to migrate – have more chances to actually 
migrate, simply because they hold a job (migration is selective). Moreover, 
the employed is a larger group. 
Although migration intentions are at a different level in new and old 
Member States, broadly speaking the relative differences across subgroups 
are more or less similar. Students in the new Member States with a low 
average level of migration intentions, however, do display a higher relative 
propensity to mobility, and so do the unemployed. In the new Member States 
with
 
a high average level of migration intentions,
 
the male–female differential 
in migration intentions is particularly low. 
 To summarise, migration intentions are most pronounced among (young) 
Europeans with relatively more human capital and less household responsi-
bilities (partner, children). The intention to migrate to another country is not 
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an exclusive feature of socially or economically deprived Europeans, on the 
contrary: one needs the right human resources, the right age and life course 
stage, and the right mind-set to seriously consider such a far-reaching step as 
migrating to another country. 
Migration Intentions and the Economic Context 
According to the literature discussed, migration is expected to be driven – at 
least partly – by the general macro-economic context. Poor economic 
opportunities and prospects could serve as direct or indirect incentives to 
migrate. But exactly how macro-economic features shape and reinforce the 
decision to move, and how the causal links between the two operate, is still 
not very well understood and is open to multiple interpretations. To further 
elaborate and illustrate the relationships between macro-economic conditions 
and migration readiness, correlations are presented between migration 
intentions and GDP per head, GDP growth rate and the rate of long-term 
unemployment for all 25 countries in the survey. Findings presented in 
Figure 3.2 show a clear U-shaped relationship between migration intentions 
and GDP: the inclination to migrate to another country is highest at both 
relatively low and relatively high GDP levels. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Relationship between intentions to migrate and GDP per head 
 (EU25 = 100) 
A similar relationship is found with the GDP growth rate as denoted in 
Figure 3.3. This result contrasts with Hatton and Williamson (2002) who 
expect an inverted-U relationship. However, our finding matches with the 
outcome obtained by Pedersen et al. (2004). No clear relationship, however, 
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is found with respect to the rate of long-term unemployment as shown in 
Figure 3.4. The unemployment level is not a direct correlate of migration 
proneness. It can be concluded that the relationship between macro-economic 
conditions and migration intention is not linear: both very disadvantageous 
and very advantageous wealth levels function as stimuli – albeit for very 
different reasons – for migration readiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Relationship between intentions to migrate and GDP growth rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Relationship between intentions to migrate and long-term 
 unemployment rate 
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As outlined in Section 3.2, migration theory has come up with quite clear 
hypotheses with respect to the effect of income inequality on migration as 
forwarded by in particular Borjas (1987, 1994), including negative self-
selection (more income inequality in home country than in host country), and 
positive self-selection (more income inequality in host country than in home 
country). However, we are not able to confirm these predictions with the data 
at hand.  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Relationship between intentions to migrate and income 
 inequality, low educated 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Relationship between intentions to migrate and income 
 inequality, highly educated 
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Migration intentions of the lower educated do not seem to be responsive to 
income inequality as indicated by the findings presented in Figure 3.5.11 For 
the higher educated the relationship is positive, as shown in Figure 3.6, with 
lower mobility intentions at low levels of income inequality and higher 
intentions as inequality increases.  
In short: neither the negative selection hypothesis nor the positive 
selection hypothesis could be confirmed. We need to stress, though, that 
these results do not signify a ‘hard’ test of the Borjas hypotheses. Such a test 
would require to controlling for differences in relative inequality between the 
home and the host country. As indicated in Section 3.1, information about the 
host country is, unfortunately, not included in the Eurobarometer Mobility 
Survey. 
3.5 DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION INTENTIONS 
In order to gain insight into the determinants of migration intentions, we 
applied multivariate analysis techniques. We estimate a logit model where 
the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the respondent expresses an 
intention to migrate to another country within the next five years, and the 
value 0 when the respondent has no moving intention at all.12 Because of 
page limits constraints, we present highlights from the results in this section 
and refer the reader to Fouarge and Ester (2007) for the full results and a 
detailed discussion of them. Several models were estimated. The first model 
was estimated on all 25 EU countries. In the second, we replaced the country 
dummies with macro-economic characteristics of the country respondents 
live in. Finally, the model was estimated for respondents in the old and new 
Member States separately. The models include measures of:  
 
1. human
 
capital
 
(a dummy variable for females, the educational level, age); 
2. current employment status; 
3. household structure; 
4. housing tenure status; 
5. country dummies (or alternatively macro characteristics of the country of 
residence); 
6. overall view on cross-border mobility (cultural component of 
migration);13 
7. past experience with geographical mobility;14 
8. nationality; 
9. perceived socio-economic and socio-cultural effects of cross-border 
mobility.15 
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The key findings from the analyses are reported in Table 3.2. We begin by 
discussing the results for the EU25 countries. 
Correlates of Migration in EU25 Countries 
The models do confirm the bivariate findings from the previous section: there 
are strong age effects on migration intentions and the educational level is a 
very robust determinant too. Young people are much more likely to migrate 
than older people, and so are the higher educated and students compared to 
people with an average or low educational level. This confirms our 
expectations 1 and 2 as outlined in Section 3.2. This is an important finding 
for it shows that young people are a very mobile cohort. They seem well 
aware of the fact that moving abroad may contribute to increasing their level 
of human capital. It is likely that EU policies aiming at encouraging the 
mobility of the higher skilled and of students are contributing to the high 
level of mobility intentions among these groups. Interestingly, the migration 
intentions of the low educated in the new Member States are significantly 
lower than average. This finding suggests that the fear of high migration 
streams of low-skilled from East to West is probably unwarranted. 
The model also reveals some important life course effects. As expected, 
the presence of children in a household reduces the likelihood of mobility. 
This is probably because there are additional costs (financial and psycho-
social) to migrating for parents of (young) children. Single people, however, 
are more prone to migrate, which confirms one of our expectations. For 
singles, family bounds are weaker, making it psychologically and socially 
more easy to migrate in order to meet new opportunities. These findings are 
in support of expectation 3. 
Other things held equal, homeowners have significantly lower migration 
intentions, albeit not in new Member States with an overall low level of 
migration intentions. This is probably due to the fact that home ownership 
contributes to increasing the costs of migration. All in all, people with a 
positive attitude towards migration issues tend to be more prone to develop 
migration intentions for themselves. An explanation could be that they are 
more open to and perhaps also ready for new challenges and new experiences 
in a different country. 
The model includes additional variables pertaining to long distance 
mobility in the past and the expected effects of future migration. Past 
mobility turns out to be a strong predictor of future intended mobility. This 
confirms earlier findings according to which long distance mobility is not a 
phenomenon on its own, but part of other geographic transitions people make 
throughout their life (Vandenbrande et al., 2006). This conclusion is also 
illustrated by the effect of past labour market mobility on migration 
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intentions: people who report more changes of employer in the past are more 
likely to report an intention to move abroad. This evidence suggests that past 
experiences reduce possible reservations (due to actual practice, better 
information) one might have to migrate (again) in the future. This confirms 
expectation 4.  
Table 3.2 Highlights from logit model for migration intentions in Europe, 
 sign of significant parameters from the model 
 EU25 Old 
Member 
States 
New 
Member 
States;  
low 
intentions 
New 
Member 
States; high 
intentions 
Female – – 0 – 
High educated/students + / ++ + / ++ + / ++ + / ++ 
Youth + + 0 + 
Couple with children  – – 0 – 
Single + + + 0 
Homeowner – – 0 – 
Experienced long distance mobility 
   in past 
+ + + + 
Positive views on mobility  + + + + 
Fears for employment/income 0 0 0 0 
Fears for social ties  – – – 0 
Language as a barrier – – 0 0 
GDP level in home country (non- 
   linear) 
– 
(U-shaped) 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
Inequality in home country  
 
0 
(also for high 
educated) 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
Notes: 
–: significant negative effect 
+: significant positive effect 
0: no significant effect 
×: variable not included 
Comparing Countries in East and West 
The country effects in the model reflect the overall findings in Section 3.4. 
Significantly lower propensities to migrate are found in southern Europe 
(Spain, Italy and Portugal), in Germanic countries (Germany and Austria) 
and in the Czech Republic. Significantly larger propensities are found for 
four of the ten new Member States (Latvia, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania). 
Replacing the country effects by macro-level variables allows us to test the 
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effect of institutional variables on the propensity to migrate. The estimates 
clearly show a U-shaped relationship between GDP per head and migration 
intentions already depicted in Figure 3.2. This partly confirms expectation 7. 
Other macro-level variables have been included in the model: the level of 
income inequality, the rate of unemployment, the rate of long-term 
unemployment, the average tax rate on labour and the poverty risk rate (all 
measured in the home country). None of these variables have a significant 
effect on migration intentions. The predicted negative relationship between 
the level of inequality and the migration intentions of the high educated is 
found in the data, but is not significant. The share of social protection 
spending in GDP is, however, negatively correlated with migration 
intentions. This could mean that people see the welfare state as a kind of risk 
insurance that they are not ready to revoke by migrating to another country 
with lesser social protection.  
The variables concerning the expected effects of future migration show 
interesting differences between respondents in the new and the old Member 
States. The results show that the expected loss of social contacts due to 
migration fundamentally inhibits the migration intentions of people in old 
Member States and in new Member States with low overall migration 
intentions (this confirms expectation 6).16 However, such an effect is not 
found for respondents in the Baltics and Poland. This either means that 
people there value social networks less or that they do not fear the assumed 
loss of social networks following migration, maybe because they do not 
intend to migrate permanently. These two competing explanations need 
further research. The results also show that respondents in the old Member 
States do perceive sufficient knowledge of other languages as a major 
difficulty for migrating in the future, but no significant effect in the new 
Member States. Henceforth, expectation 5 is only confirmed in EU15. A 
possible explanation is that the willingness of the latter to invest in acquiring 
new language skills is simply greater because their perceived gains from 
cross-border migration are greater too. Explaining this difference is also in 
need of further empirical exploration. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
One aspect of transitional labour markets pertains to the international 
mobility and allocation of labour. This issue has been raised in this chapter 
by analysing migration intentions in Europe and trying to understand what 
micro and macro factors trigger such intentions. In 2004 and again in 2007 
the EU was enlarged by a total of 12 countries. These successive 
enlargements have fed the policy and societal debates in Europe on whether 
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or not the borders should be opened to allow the free movement of workers 
and on the effect of free movement of labour on the economy. A question of 
interest from the point of view of transitional labour markets is whether or 
not massive migration of people will take place all over Europe, particularly 
from new Member States to old Member States. 
In this study we focused on migration intentions of Europeans and 
investigated the main determinants of such intentions. We do reckon that 
such intentions cannot be taken on their face value as perfect predictors of 
real future migration flows. Yet, studying the factors shaping these intentions 
is a meaningful exercise. We use data from a module on mobility of the 
Eurobarometer Survey (EB 64.1). The data were gathered in September 2005 
in all 25 countries that were member of the EU at that time. This survey is the 
most comprehensive and the most recent survey on mobility in Europe.  
Despite the increasing pressure of globalisation and of the knowledge 
economy (both developments are promoting labour migration), our findings 
indicate that Europeans are not that willing to move to another country. Only 
5.4 per cent of the working-age population intends to move to another 
country within the next five years. Percentage-wise, intentional cross-border 
migration is not and is not expected to become a widespread phenomenon in 
Europe in the near future. However, this average EU percentage masks a 
great diversity within Europe: mobility intentions are at a higher level in 
Poland and the Baltic States, at a lower level among the old Member States, 
and at an even lower level among other new Member States. However, given 
the large population size of some of the countries with a relatively high level 
of migration intentions (for example Poland), it is conceivable that large 
numbers will indeed cross the borders. As suggested by various studies large 
numbers are indeed entering the labour markets of Western Europe (Ecorys, 
2006), and the EU membership of Eastern and central European seems to 
have triggered these streams (Corpeleijn, 2007).  
However, as Fassmann and Münz (2002) observe, the extent of labour 
migration from the Eastern European countries in the future will depend on 
the demographic development in those countries. The authors note that 
fertility rates in the ten new Member States have been declining over the past 
decade, while mortality rates have been increasing. As a result of this shrink 
in the population size, the younger cohorts will benefit from better chances 
on the labour market, which in turn might reduce their readiness to migrate.17 
In addition, the projected positive economic and labour market development 
in comparison to the old Member States due to increased foreign direct 
investment and the sustained availability of regional and structural funds will 
improve working and living conditions with the consequence of reduced 
incentives for migration. 
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In particular the highly educated and highly qualified workers are more 
likely to cross the country borders within Europe, but also students. This 
finding is in line with the development of a knowledge economy, and it could 
mean there are potential brain drain risks for some regions in Europe. 
However, the extent of this brain drain risk will depend on whether or not 
migration has a permanent character. The evidence here suggests that 
migration in Europe is part of a human capital investment strategy. Young 
Europeans are more migration prone than older Europeans, that is those 
countries face a combined brain and youth drain. The issue is whether this 
reflects an age effect or a cohort effect. If the latter were to be the case, this 
would of course change future migration flows in Europe quite drastically. 
Systematic monitoring of inter- and intra-age-cohort migration trends is 
essential for answering this crucial topic. 
Perceived labour market opportunities are decisive motives for migration 
but migration has a cost to individuals too, in terms of the potential loss of 
social ties, socio-cultural differences and language barriers. From our 
analyses, it appears that these costs have a strong negative effect on the 
migration decision of people in the old Member States of Europe but that 
they play a lesser role in new Member States. The reason for this difference 
in costs structure is left to further scrutiny: is it due to the fact that Eastern 
and Central Europeans more often see migration as an investment in their 
human capital, because they care less about such barriers to migration, or 
simply because they see migration as a temporary event? 
NOTES
 
1. We acknowledge financial support from the European Foundation (project 0336 ‘Analysis of 
Eurobarometer on mobility’). Use of the Eurobarometer data was granted by the European 
Commission. This book chapter is based on the report ‘Determinants of international 
regional migration intentions in Europe’, a report that we wrote for the European Foundation 
(Fouarge and Ester, 2007). 
2. All percentages are from European Commission (2006), p. 17. 
3. Between 2002 and 2005 the increase in migration intentions of new Member States’ 
inhabitants has been a factor 2.4 larger than the corresponding increase among residents of 
the ‘old’ Members States. 
4. See also Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) for a similar approach. 
5. First descriptive results of this Mobility Survey were reported by Vandenbrande et al. (2006) 
in a study commissioned by the European Foundation. 
6. The study was conducted in close cooperation with the European Foundation (Karppinen et 
al., 2006; Krieger, 2006; Vandenbrande et al., 2006). 
7. Data were collected by TNS Opinion & Social. The interviews were conducted between 
02/09/2005 and 06/10/2005. The survey covers the national population of citizens of the 
respective nationalities and the population of citizens of all the EU Member States that were 
residents in those countries and have a sufficient command of one of the respective national 
language(s) to answer the questionnaire. 
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8. See for example: Tidrick (1971), Finifter (1976), Faini et al. (1997), Burda et al. (1998), Ahn 
et al. (1999), Chiquiar and Hanson (2002), Krieger (2004), Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) 
and Hadler (2006). 
9. Krieger (2004) argues that those people with a ‘firm’ intention to migrate could be identified 
with an additional question on the readiness to live in a country where the official language 
is different from the mother tongue. Such information is not available in our data, and it is 
not likely that such a scaling factor should be the same for all countries. 
10. In the Eurobarometer, the educational attainment is measured by the age at which one 
finished full-time education. For ease of exposition, we have recoded this measure into three 
levels: those who stopped before the age of 16 qualify as lower educated; those who stopped 
between the age of 16 and 19 are said to have an average educational level; people who left 
full time education at age 20 or above are higher educated. 
11. See Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) for a similar finding. 
12. This means that individuals with an intention to move within the country are discarded from 
the analyses. Including them in the reference category would wrongly assume that they have 
no moving intentions at all.  
13. It is computed as the sum of the answers to the five questions on whether people think 
mobility is a good thing for individuals, their family, the economy, the labour market and for 
European integration. Answers were coded 0 if the respondent is indifferent, –1 if s/he thinks 
it is a bad thing and 1 if s/he thinks it is a good thing. It is assumed that it captures a general 
notion of ‘culture’ of migration. 
14. It is measured in terms of the longest move ever made since one left the parental home. 
15. Whether people expect a loss of social contacts, a loss of employment opportunities, 
language or cultural barriers, or worse housing or public facilities. 
16. These are people who report that ‘To miss the support from family or friends’ or ‘To miss 
the direct contact with family or friends’ would discourage them from moving to another 
country. 
17. The authors also expect these countries to become immigration countries for citizens from 
other Eastern European countries such as Ukraine and Romania.  
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